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ABSTRACT
This discussion paper is the result of empirical research. The argument is
driven by the question of what constitutes appropriate and practical Native
Title Representative Body (NTRB) responses to the proposed amendments
where legislation is expected to focus on organisational structure,
administrative and financial processes and policy procedures. All NTRBs
will be affected by the scale of the proposed administrative changes as
issues of control, representation and accountability are common
operational concerns across the board. However, material from the case
study suggests the amendments are more likely to impact significantly on
the capacity of smaller regional organisations to respond effectively. The
wider administrative emphasis given to concern with control,
representation and accountability are discussed with reference to how at
least one NTRB can develop responses which are both practical and
realistic in policy terms.
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In 1995, two years after the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) was proclaimed,
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
commissioned a consolidation Review to assess the 'effectiveness of the
Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) determined under the Native
Title Act 1993' (ATSIC 1995: iii). The major terms of reference
encompassed an investigation of existing and future arrangements through:
• a survey of representative bodies which would include data on claims
researched and lodged with the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT);
geographic coverage of representative bodies and the relationship of
those bodies to other bodies; and the responsiveness of representative
bodies to issues brought to their attention;
• assessment of the effectiveness of representative bodies in terms of
their functions and responsibilities under the Act; and
• identification of management and funding strategies to address
problems apparent in the review (ATSIC 1995:1-2).
The ATSIC Board of Commissioners further identified a key set of issues
for consideration including the:
• definition of the precise roles and responsibilities of representative
bodies;
• level of expertise desirable for the staffing of representative bodies;
• identification of any additional measures which should be taken in
order to maximise efficient and appropriate service to Indigenous
people in native title matters; and
• appropriateness of financial and administrative arrangements currently
in place for native title assistance' (ATSIC 1995: 2).
The recommendations of the Review provide a useful model for strategic
directions in the ongoing development of organisational structures and
administrative procedures by which NTRBs can provide effective service
delivery. The review also suggested a timetable for post-review
implementation of its recommendations. It is surprising then, that many of
the review's recommendations were either ignored or languished as NTRBs
proliferated. Consequently, the Federal Liberal-National government's
recent (1996) proposals to introduce amendments to the NTA focus, in
detail, on tightening the requirements under the Commonwealth's NTA for
financial accountability and representation in NTRBs. An additional reason
for the amendments directly concerns the operational effectiveness of
NTRBs based in the constant criticism by industry groups of the
'unworkability1 of the NTA, together with industry 'uncertainty' about the
capacity of many NTRBs to operate as effective representative bodies with
peak body status, hi addition, the level and intensity of intra-Indigenous
conflict associated with much of the native title claims process, in concert
with the difficulties faced by NTRBs in resolving these disputes, has
fuelled public criticism and demands for Federal Government intervention
and greater external scrutiny. Finally, the proposed amendments to the
NTA follow a series of legal judgments which found that questions of law
could not be decided by the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT). These
recent decisions seriously affect the capacity of the NNTT to implement a
threshold test for claims when they are lodged, and as a consequence some
claimant groups lodged ambit or similarly inappropriate claims. (The
NNTT also now cannot make a determination of claim status but can only
mediate agreements amongst parties; it is the Federal court which has to
make determinations.)
The proposed amendments (Commonwealth of Australia 1996a), due for
introduction into the Commonwealth Parliament in 1997, seek to rectify
the identified loopholes in the administrative processes of claim research,
preparation and consultation with claimants which are expected of NTRBs.
Changes with respect to the ministerial process for determining NTRBs;
increased functions and obligations for greater financial accountability; and
amendments to the right to negotiation (RTN) process for mining under the
future act regime (see ATSIC 1996; Commonwealth of Australia 1996b;
Smith 1996) have been specified for amendment.
Following the incorporation of the proposed amendments into legislation, a
12 month 'transition period' will enable presently registered NTRBs to
continue to operate with the proviso that existing NTRBs will be required
to reapply for representative status.
At first glance many of the proposed changes to NTRB organisational
accountability and claims management seem onerous in the extreme. In
fact, the basis of many of the proposals stem from recommendations
in the 1995 Review (ATSIC 1995). However, the review balanced
'accountability1 with recommendations for greater NTRB statutory powers.
The amendments, by comparison, ask for greater accountability while
ignoring the balance required by increasing their mandatory powers. Not
surprisingly, a philosophical tension has emerged between Indigenous and
bureaucratic positions that argue the organisation's brief is to provide a
professionally-based regional service, against an alternative view that the
organisation must be organically grounded through grass-roots
representation, control and the incorporation of localist concerns.
In this paper, questions of what constitutes an appropriate NTRB response
to the proposed amendments are problematised in relation to what
processes best serve Indigenous interests in the native title claim
procedures. Such questions are apt since legislative attention in the
amendments will focus on organisational structure, administrative and
financial processes and policy procedures, including matters of internal
accountability and equity in regional representation. Similar issues of
accountability were apparent in the case material presented during the 1996
review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (ACA) (see
Martin and Finlayson 1996). However if all future NTRBs are to be
incorporated under this Act, as proposed in the amendments, then policy
makers will need to at least be familiar with the recommendations of the
ACA review with regard to accountability and representation.
This discussion paper focuses primarily on the internal issues faced by
smaller NTRBs in accommodating the changes required by the proposed
amendments - though these are matters of concern for all the NTRBs. The
paper begins with a broad ethnographic description of one particular
NTRB and its history, followed by discussion of the principles of what
constitutes policy realism in the context of the necessity to make an
appropriate organisational response with respect to issues of control,
accountability, and representation. For reasons of confidentiality the NTRB
is not identified by name.
The organisational setting
Early in 1997, I spent one week with an NTRB of the organisational size
referred to in the Review as a (hypothetical) Model 2 (ATSIC 1995: 75).
As the Review describes it, their notion of organisational models is based
on a correlation between workload requirements and organisational
structure. This formula was established in an effort to give parity between
the two very sharp divisions amongst NTRBs - (1) that of the big, well
established and long established NTRB; as against (2) the small under-
resourced NTRB only recently set up. Model 2 is described as consisting
of '10 staff ... The major difference between the two models [Model 1 and
Model 2] is that the latter only consists of one legal officer, one
anthropologist, one research officer, one field officer and one secretarial
position. Model 2, however, includes an accountant/book-keeper position'
(ATSIC 1995: 117).
In the Review's proposal each Model was costed according to a formula for
the associated salary and salary-related costs, capital and recurrent costs,
based on anticipated and differential workload agreements. It was clearly
understood by the Review team that workloads for native title claims
would differ regionally and by State according to differing development
interests and land tenure. Certainly, this has proved to be the case. For
example, the majority of future act notices occur in Western Australia
while a minority have been lodged in Victoria. It was also stated that
funding 'agreements' should be established by ATSIC with each NTRB
based on actual reality of their differing workloads.
In practice, the application of workload agreements to funding allocations
has not been established as a direct relationship. In part, this was because
the issues of native title continue to show differentiation between each
State. Not only has the actual volume of claims research, management,
preparation and dispute resolution expanded exponentially, but more
importantly, ATSIC did not implement the workload funding formula.
Consequently, although the NTRB I investigated had begun with the
staffing structure and funding regime appropriate for a Model 2
organisation, it had departed from the original conception of an indicative
staffing model to include three field officers (instead of two), two legal
officers (instead of one), and several administrative staff (but with the
anthropologist's position vacant). All anthropological research was out-
sourced, as indeed was much of the legal work. Such changes in workloads
were envisaged by the review. For this reason, baseline funding and
staffing models were not fixed.
In the early 1980s, a non-statutory land council with limited on-the-ground
experience of research or involvement in land matters and with no secure
or ongoing funding base, had operated in the area. The name of the present
NTRB is the same as its predecessor and although it is now a regionally-
based land council with different personnel and local loyalties and
constituted under the NTA, many constituents continue to associated it
with its predecessor. Unfortunately, this has led to expectations of the
NTRB's performance being based on the opinions held of its predecessor.
Moreover, the establishment of the organisation as an NTRB rather than as
the reemergence of the earlier land council has meant a shaky path. In the
period immediately after the land council gained its initial status as an
NTRB, its ability to function effectively was dogged by internal disputes
centred around doubts about its representative structure; not an
uncommon issue in Aboriginal organisations (see Martin 1996; Martin and
Finlayson 1996).
Eventually, these matters were managed through a change of governing
committee membership and administrative personnel and by organisational
consolidation of NTRB profile. At this point, the organisation was able to
wholeheartedly turn its attention to its mandate for native title claim work.
However, this process took a period of some months during which
factional disputes challenged the authority and legitimacy of various
parties to comprise the governing committee and to administer the
organisation's funds. Although the organisation is no longer dogged by the
combination of factors which led to such an impasse, a number of critical
organisational and representational matters have continued to require
consideration and resolution.
Control
In this particular organisation, just as in many other Aboriginal
organisations, the question of who is in control is open to constant
challenge, debate and revision. This is not simply a question of the
composition of the local Aboriginal representation on the board; although
this is certainly discussed publicly in the region. In essence, the question is
a matter of where the locus of decision making lies and the inevitable
tension associated with it of whether it is the governing committee or the
administrative staff, led by the executive officer, who monopolises the
role. Indeed, control at an organisational level for many Aboriginal people
appears to be an issue judged by the degree of so-called community control
and participation. Yet in many cases, to define control in terms of grass-
roots participation is more of an ideological position or statement of
symbolic Aboriginal authority, since the actual composition of a governing
committee is more often than not reflective of the dominance of particular
family groups and interest groups, or even the prominence of a sub-
regional population. On the other hand, grass-roots control is not
necessarily expected by Aboriginal people to reflect democratic
participation. Often the contrast in the nodes of power within an
organisation demarcates community factions (said to be those with a
mandate of authority) from professional and bureaucratic groupings (said
to be those whose role it is to be directed, since they are without the
mandate of Aboriginal authority).
To continue to cast the relationship between an NTRB and its Indigenous
constituency as a grass-roots dynamic is also a difficult position to sustain,
since as Smith (1995: 68) rightly observed 'NTRBs are not based upon
traditional authority structures, even though they are required to establish
their public legitimacy partly in terms of being able to speak for, and on
behalf of, landowning groups. First and foremost, they are a new class of
legislatively created institutions located at the interface between
Indigenous values in relation to land and aspirations, and those of the
wider Australian political and economic system'.
Smith's characterisation derives from expectations of NTRBs as specified
in their responsibilities and statutory functions. In practice, fierce
resistance from members of the governing committee to the notion of an
impersonal relationship between themselves and the administration of the
organisation is not uncommon; including arguments about decision-
making and the allocation of financial and infrastructural resources and
differential access and control of these by NTRB constituents and staff.
Underlying the belief that community organisations should reflect local
interests through all levels of their executive and administration is all too
often an unexamined notion of the 'community1 and the 'community's
vision'. Such notions belie the fact that regions are composed of local
groups with highly articulated local visions and views of their own position
and of their relationship in the wider regional context of Aboriginal affairs.
In this sense, there is no unified or homogeneous vision from the
constituency's position, and yet there is an expectation that NTRBs will
find or develop a regional role capable of transcending localism. The
successful NTRB will be capable of developing a regional role
encompassing of localism.
The capacity to construct a relationship between local groups and a
regional structure in the NTRB in this case study was also limited by the
necessity - common to most NTRBs - to incorporate under the ACA.
Generally, new organisations use off-the-shelf constitutions offered by the
Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations and, over time, set about adapting the
generic constitution to suit their particular needs. Pan of the difficulty of
resolving questions of control is institutionalising the locus of authority in
the organisation. In some cases, generic constitutions severely inhibit the
capacity of an organisation to structure an appropriate relationship between
the members of the organisation and its constituents; nowhere is this
limitation more evident than in the constitutional regulations for the annual
general meeting. In the context of these organisations the term 'appropriate'
is taken to mean an articulated relationship with the capacity to
accommodate changing needs, changing funding regimes, changes in
requirements for internal accountability and external scrutiny, and so forth.
This goes beyond the simple question of what structures or bureaucratic
relationships are 'culturally appropriate'; an issue investigated in the ACA
Review. Some respondents to the ACA Review were uncertain about the
interpretation of 'culturally appropriate' in terms of structuring or
administering their organisations and how some issues might apply to
Aboriginal people in rural or urban communities who tend to see
themselves as sharing commonalities with the dominant culture.
Another commonly occurring problem in NTRBs with respect to control is
the relationship between the governing committee and its administration.
Too often administrative staff in the case study were denied autonomy in
their day-to-day work and their efforts, especially when professional
advice on matters offered to the governing committee were treated with
unnecessary suspicion. Explanations for problems of this kind are that
members of governing committees too often lack any formal training in
management and board duties and also lack experience as board members.
The problems point to the critical need for duty statements and codes of
conduct to guide incoming board members and codes for relationships with
management. Autonomy is not a license for undertaking actions which do
not have to be accounted for. But it implies a contract of trust between the
governing committee and the administrative staff by which daily
administration of the organisation's work is achieved free of factional
intervention and direction or personal interference.
Furthermore, the newly elected governing committee member may have
had little previous experience of the particular organisation and its highly
complex statutory duties and therefore only a limited conception of its
organisational role. Indeed, unlike previous community organisations, the
role of the NTRB is radically different. In addition, its functions and
responsibilities are legislated requirements under the NTA, which means
that the capacity of governing committee members to direct the activities
of the NTRB are not as flexible or negotiable as they might be in other
incorporated bodies and organisational contexts.
Under the proposed amendments to the NTA, the statutory functions and
responsibilities will increase, especially in relation to financial
accountability to the external funding sources. Hard decisions about
rationalisation of resources and funding priorities for claims will be
required of NTRBs under the new responsibilities. However, where there is
limited understanding of the organisation other than as a community body,
these requirements are likely to be resisted.
The bottom line however, is that to retain NTRB status in the post-
amendment period, NTRBs must have in place policy and procedural
mechanisms for transparent decision-making; processes for accountability
of claims prioritisation and review; contracts for out-sourcing of legal and
anthropological work; mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms; staff
and management accountability to regional land owners and board
management duty statements and codes of conduct. These requirements
require the governing committee to establish policy domains based on
publicly known processes and procedures, and presumably on which they,
as the executive, could (and will, inevitably) be called to account.
In the case study, it was clear that many of the administrative staff of the
NTRB felt that the executive called them to account on issues of
authorising expenditure, yet resisted any financial scrutiny or expectation
of accountability in their own decision-making and financial arrangements.
Relations between the elected and administrative arms of the organisation
were often tense and distrustful. It was also apparent that many executive
members had a limited appreciation of the day-to-day administration of the
organisation and that procedures and policies existed for management of
the administration and that staff worked within guidelines established and
detailed in their duty statements. In some senses, what one found was a
situation where the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration was
curtailed by the limitations of the governing committee to set policy
agendas and to respond with relevance to the management issues by
providing appropriate leadership.
Nevertheless, control in an NTRB is not simply a question of dividing
power between the executive and the administration. Public scrutiny of
decision-making and transparent management must be observable by
constituents. In the case study, the NTRB began to deal with the thorny
issues of 'control' by initiating a publicly accessible organisational
document of policies and procedures. A second step involved providing
professional development for governing committee members in terms of
their own accountability to constituents, duty statements and codes of
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conduct and, encouragement to defer to the policy manual when disputes
about NTRB management or claim funding erupted in the wider
community.
There are distinct benefits in developing a policy manual and operating
with reference to stated procedures. One benefit is that organisations like
NTRBs educate their constituency to an expectation that actions have to
operate with reference to certain procedures and public accountability. For
some communities and individuals, external accountability will involve a
paradigm shift since organisational outcomes have often resulted from the
influence and patronage of particular individuals or powerful families in
organisations. Field officers in the NTRB case study reported that many
constituents expected the organisation to continue to operate 'under the
table and not according to rules'. Previously, control, power and decision-
making had operated by informal processes; a system in which key
individuals were the means of access and action.
Accountability
Much of the discussion above has touched on the wider procedural issues
of formal organisational control (constitution, governing committee, policy
manuals). In the following section, the issue of accountability is discussed
with specific attention to two matters endemic in the NTRB case study.
Firstly, the structure of relationships between external bodies and the
governing committee, particularly evident in disputes over out-sourcing of
professional work (legal and anthropological) is outlined. Secondly,
management issues as a function of the relationship between the governing
committee and the administration is discussed.
Initially the organisation had a limited number of professional staff and
this necessitated out-sourcing where specific expertise was required during
claim preparation. The majority of anthropological and legal work was
handled through consultancies. A number of district law firms were
engaged. In some cases, the solicitors took the view that they were more
capable and better placed to represent the claimants' interests than could
the NTRB. Over time, some of the legal out-sourcing developed into
situations where the legal firm contested the NTRB's management and
control over funding for their clients by maintaining that separate
representation in the mediation process was in the claimants' best interests.
These legal firms encouraged a point of view that separate representation
was not only necessary, but equitable and that funding should be
coordinated by them, not by the NTRB. However, such arguments were
often a response to efforts by the NTRB to rationalise and prioritise
allocation of funding resources and decisions about which claims to
progress. The same arguments were also brought up when the NTRB
attempted to resolve overlapping claims and disputes between claimants
using separate lawyers paid for by the NTRB.
Local law firms often had little appreciation of the NTRB's mandate under
the NTA to resolve disputes between claimants (see s.202 (4) NTA). In
line with the traditions of their practice legal firms handling native title
cases inevitably adopted an overly legalistic and adversarial approach to
legal representation of their clients. In general, such an adversarial role has
not usually included mediation of disputes between claimants.
The proposed amendments will extend NTRB's responsibility for conflict
mediation, in conjunction with an expectation that NTRBs develop policies
to prioritise and stipulate the bases on which resources are allocated to
claims. A summary of the proposed changes is provided by ATSIC in their
1996 publication Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act 1993:
Issues for Indigenous Peoples. Representative bodies will also have
specific dispute resolution functions to ensure that competing claims are
resolved, including claims that have already been lodged. Such functions
will include the resolution of conflict concerning consultations, mediations,
negotiations or proceedings under the NTA. A new internal review
mechanism will be provided by NTRBs to native titleholders who wish to
challenge their decisions and actions' (ATSIC 1996: 27).
In the NTRB case study, the majority of their 14 claims were out-sourced
to local legal firms. In some cases, the solicitors involved suggested to
their clients that efforts by the NTRB to resolve claimant disputes
represented a conflict of interest (see also Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) 1997: 72-82). According to this legal view, no
grounds existed for an NTRB to handle such situations nor should/could
they take decisions about prioritising claims funding, least of all to refuse
funding to one party of disputing claimants. When the NTRB had
attempted to exercise their prerogative in decision-making, the response of
one legal firm involved was to immediately seek alternative funding from
the Legal Aid and Family Services (LAPS) section of the Commonwealth's
Attorney-Generals Department. At an earlier point in the development of
the native title process, some claims from the region had been funded by
ATSIC and LAPS independently of an NTRB. This arrangement was
largely a consequence of the fact that the first claims from the region
lodged with the NNTT occurred prior to Ministerial recognition of an
NTRB to service the area.
Irrespective of the impetus for change associated with the proposed
amendments, in this case study, it is necessary that the NTRB rethink its
organisational structures and administrative practices if it is to develop
successfully as a service organisation. This process necessitates careful
policy formulation for decision making about allocation of funds, protocols
for consultation with claimants, accountability procedures to constituents,
and so forth. Arrangements to out-source work on a contractual basis are
critical. Accountability frameworks must be specified by the NTRB for the
private solicitors and other advisers engaged by it (see Stead (1997) for
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discussion of what some of these contractual issues include). The Review
addressed what its authors recognised as the essential conditions in which
such a relationship should be managed. In particular, the Review
recommended NTRB coordination and management of the process as a
priority (ATSIC 1995: 19, 2.55). Aware, from bitter experience, of the
wisdom of this recommendation, the NTRB staff in the case study are now
struggling to regain financial and coordinated control of the management
of their out-sourced claims.
The problem of control over the claims process for the NTRB in question
was further compounded by pressure on native title claimants from some
of the professionals involved in out-sourcing, to operate independently of
the representative body - whether in disputes with other claimant parties or
in mediation conferences. The capacity to so influence claimants was in
large measure achievable because of the generally low level of
understanding about the role of NTRBs in the wider Aboriginal
community and the high level of suspicion with which many claimants
regard one another, in combination with a competitive approach over
access to funding resources. Furthermore, many of the local professionals
were themselves sources of poor advice in terms of knowledge of the
statutory requirements of NTRBs and the nature of the proposed
amendments in relation to accountability mechanisms, policy and
procedures for claims management.
Yet, there is little reason to see the NTRB case study as an exception in its
relationship with out-sourced professionals, since the importance of these
issues were first addressed by the land councils established in the Northern
Territory in the mid-1970s and has continued to be addressed (see
Australian National Audit Office (1993) review of Northern Land
Council's use of consultants). Understandably, most of the new NTRBs are
struggling to deal with an increasing and high volume of claim research,
but with a limited number of experienced staff. The reality is the
continuing necessity for reliance on external professionals for some time to
come.
A second major issue faced by the particular NTRB I observed, but
common amongst many NTRBs, was the problem of how to deal with
issues of administrative accountability in the relationship between the
NTRB's governing committee and its administration (see also ICAC 1997:
33-47).
With changes to the functions and obligations of NTRBs in the political
winds, the governing committees of many NTRBs may be required to
make a conceptual leap with respect to their understanding of their roles
and responsibilities. An NTRB is not fundamentally a grass-roots
community organisation. It is a new creature which must operate according
to statutory functions. The transition to operating according to a different
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set of requirements than that which has been understood of community
organisations in the past, is a fraught process for many NTRBs. The
tensions involved are often identifiable in the debate about accountability
between the administrative and the elected arms of the organisation.
In the case study, the onus for organisational accountability rested with the
administrative personnel, at least in the view of many governing committee
members. Questions were raised at monthly governing committee meetings
about the work performances of staff and they were expected to acquit all
field expenditures. However, the same questions were not expected to be
raised by the administrative staff over use of funds or decisions made by
members of the governing committee. The processes of decision-making
were made largely in the absence of public knowledge or access to
decision-making processes, codes of conduct, conditions for financial
reimbursement, or organisational policies for review of decisions. Staff felt
they were often in the position of being denied access to knowledge of how
decisions were reached by the governing committee or how these decisions
might be reconsidered. They also felt compromised by decisions of the
governing committee to spend funds in areas unrelated to native title
matters. Not only were staff not expected to question these decisions, but
they were expected to juggle the finances to accommodate them.
On occasions, staff had been reminded that their role in the organisation
was to 'carry out the decisions' of the governing committee. They had little
authority to question decisions. In such a climate of workplace relations,
the issue of delegation of authority and responsibility was problematic.
Most staff felt they alone were scrutinised for accountability in the
workplace, with little accountability expected of the elected arm and no
structure for articulating the poor performance of governing committee
members to the regional community.
Interestingly, some staff I interviewed were of the view that the
distrust amongst some members of the governing committee toward
the administration stemmed from the fact that staff, although
predominantly Indigenous people, were not highly visible or widely known
in the local community. Often staff lived outside the circles defined
as 'the community' and many had been educated elsewhere. These
differences led to a distinction being made in the minds of some governing
committee members between those employees who were professionally
educated and qualified to fulfil their duty statements and those staff who
were acceptable because they were 'from the community'. Once again,
tension was evident between the role of an NTRB and that of community
organisations.
A further expectation of the community-nature of the NTRB was
evidenced in constituents approaching staff on the basis of a 'one-stop
shop' to meet all their needs. In the past, many community organisations,
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including land councils, had offered constituents assistance on a range of
issues apart from land matters. In the wider community, there was a
continued perception and expectation that this was also the appropriate role
ofanNTRB.
According to the administrative staff, few members of the governing
committee were familiar with the daily administrative work of the NTRB
or the processes involved in claims preparation and research, including the
work necessary for mediation conferences. To rectify the knowledge gap,
the NTRB's office manager developed and distributed an operations
manual to the governing committee. The manual describes the
organisational profile, the rules of the corporation, workplace procedures,
duty statements of staff, policy for use of vehicles and other infrastructure,
performance reviews, grievance procedures and so forth. It is, in short, an
invaluable working guide to the organisation.
Representation
A good deal has been written of the difficulties of representation in
incorporated bodies as a consequence of the review of the ACA. The
plethora of incorporated community organisations is often a response to
unresolved, and ongoing disputes about representation in a particular
community. Indeed, one informant for the NTRB case study suggested that
the level of continuing factionalism within the present organisation was
such that a possible solution under consideration was to start an alternative
body. This organisational segmentation is, of course, an accepted practice
for Handling' disputes.
On another level, both staff and governing committee and NTRB
constituents were beginning to wrestle with the concept of what was
'representative' about a native title representative body. It was not
simply a question of how the constitution or the composition of the
governing committee should reflect the diversity of regional Indigenous
groupings. A further question was how decisions which differentially
matched financial and human resources to claimant groups were fair or
representative. A number of individuals (legal counsel and Aboriginal
claimants) argued that for an NTRB to manage disputing claims under the
same umbrella was a conflict of interest and involved inequitable
representation.
Unfortunately, the idea of the NTRB as a representative body is indeed
misleading, since it is a requirement of the appropriate functioning of the
body to make difficult decisions about how the service is delivered, to
whom, and under what circumstances; that is, representation does not mean
everyone gets everything. Inevitably, not all claims will be progressed or
researched. But such decisions must be made in an open process, in
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accordance with policy guidelines detailing how NTRB funds are
distributed amongst claims on the bases of priority, financial sustainability,
claim feasibility, and so forth. NTRBs are not required to
progress all claims in their region; their involvement in any claim has
to be on the basis of a request by claimants and with informed consent, and
then must be weighed up against their own organisational capacity to
respond.
Some of the more challenging work emerging for NTRBs is how to resolve
disputes between competing claimant parties and in the process, how to
establish representative structures which facilitate negotiation between the
parties. One of the underlying tensions promoting intra-Indigenous
disputes is the fear of not having their interests represented, including a
fear of absorption into a regional configuration where the specificities of
localism are denied or overlooked. To avoid exacerbating these anxieties,
NTRBs are asked to think laterally about how to be flexible and inclusive.
In some cases, the use of voting as a decision-making mechanism is
replaced by consensus, since voting can simply allow meetings to be
stacked and thus equal representation denied. In other situations, claimants
may be fighting one another for recognition based on the use of a corporate
group name, and acceptance may be achieved through an amalgamation of
names. Many of the intra-Indigenous disputes necessitate imaginative
solutions to issues of inclusiveness, incorporation and representation
fiercely guarded by local groups.
Concluding remarks
In preparation for the implementation of the proposed amendments and
their impact on the functions and responsibilities of NTRBs, including a
future where the bodies will be expected to reapply for representative
status, ATSIC is providing workshops devoted to drafting policies and
procedures, strategic planning, benchmarking and management, and
financial management. While the provision of such in-servicing is
necessary and timely, it is surprising that the impetus has come from the
proposed amendments to the NTA rather than a follow-through process in
keeping with the original recommendations of the NTRB Review. Perhaps
the lesson from this NTRB case study for ATSIC as a funding and
parenting body for NTRBs, is their need to develop more proactive
strategies in keeping with the onground requirements of their constituent
organisations.
To meet the proposed changes to NTRBs appropriately, NTRBs will, as
the case study plainly illustrates, have to operate with policy and financial
realism. There is no bottomless pit of money. NTRBs, irrespective of what
constituents or governing committee members think, expect or hope, are
not community, grass-roots organisations.
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First and foremost, these bodies are professional service organisations
expected by the bureaucracies funding them, as much as by their
constituents, to deliver an appropriate and competent service based on
protecting and advancing native title interests in their region of
responsibility.
In practice, this will involve a significant sea change in attitude and
workplace practices, and insistence on accountability by many of the
smaller organisations only recently established as NTRBs. It also
requires extensive education of NTRB constituencies about what native
title is, in terms of the legislative framework and what role the
representative bodies have in the process. Unlike previous incorporated
bodies, NTRBs faced a much higher level of scrutiny into their
administrative processes, policies and work practice procedures. Many
governing committee members will be expected to think in terms of
wider regional visions and in terms where localism will need to be
subsumed to achieve broad visions. The transition from old ways of
operating organisations to new and different models will not be easy. In
part, the philosophical tension between arguing for endemic local control
of NTRB decision-making processes by reference to community
grounding, and support for such organisations playing an interstitial role
between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous worlds, remains
open to debate. Unfortunately, in the present policy climate where
the High Court decision on the coexistence of pastoral leases and
native title is under challenge; where changes to the right to negotiate to
future acts has implications for claimant representation; where higher
threshold tests for lodging claims will be applied; and where new
recognition regimes for NTRBs and detailed requirements for their
increased financial scrutiny and accountability are all on the agenda,
NTRBs must be realistic about how they will engage with the new
conditions and expectations.
The value of the NTRB case study in the current policy environment
is its illustrative value. The problems of this organisation are
common to many. It is equally clear that in some cases, the administrative
vision and operating procedures of an NTRB may be in advance
of positions taken by a governing committee on questions of control,
accountability and representation. Yet, the evidence also suggests
that unless governing committees, management and staff (andconstituents)
acquaint themselves with a comprehensive knowledge of the roles,
responsibilities and functions of the NTRB, the organisation is
in danger of being dissolved once the proposed amendments are
enacted and the transition period concludes. For this reason alone
it is imperative that both clients and members of NTRBs think
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